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Constitutional Fidelity and Foreign Affairs
EDWIN MEESE, III*
CLOSING ADDRESS
Once again, the Federalist Society is sailing into the wind and
bringing its awesome intellectual firepower to bear on today's most
controversial issues of law and public policy. During this bicentennial
year of our nation's Constitution, public attention focuses on such
issues as the War Powers Resolution,1 arms control negotiations, the
Iran-Contra hearings,2 and the President's foreign policy in the Per-
sian Gulf. Therefore, there is no better time for the Federalist Society
to address the role of the Constitution in our nation's foreign policy.
In its relatively short but very intensive and potent history, the
Federalist Society has promised an interesting experience for those
who participate in its activities. This conference shows once again
that it can fulfill that promise. Perhaps more than any other group,
the Federalist Society has been faithful in relating critical public pol-
icy issues to the Constitution, thereby reminding us that the Constitu-
tion is the wellspring from which we must always derive our
fundamental government doctrines.
Several times per year throughout the country, the Federalist
Society conducts conferences that attract top conservative intellects
from law and politics, as well as a few intellectually honest individuals
from the other side of the aisle. These conferences, however, are not
exercises in philosophical antique-hunting. Rather, partially because
of the way the Society has approached these issues, these conferences
are bold explorations of the future; a future that we hope will be char-
acterized by pro-freedom economics, pro-family social policies, and
pro-Constitution jurisprudence. I am pleased that this group, which
surely includes the law school deans, the Supreme Court Justices, and
* Edwin Meese, III is currently a Distinguished Fellow at the Heritage Foundation in
Washington, D.C. and a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford
University, in California. He was Attorney General of the United States from February, 1985,
to August, 1988, and Counselor to the President from January, 1981, to February, 1985.
1. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982) (requiring the President to
report in writing to Congress within 48 hours of introducing United States armed forces into
hostilities or imminent involvement in hostilities in the absence of a declaration of war, and
further requiring that he terminate the use of the armed forces within 60 days after issuing the
report).
2. See REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-
CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. No. 433, S. REP. No. 216, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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the Attorneys General of the twenty-first century, has been reaffirm-
ing its faith in the Constitution and stimulating increased confidence
in the system of democratic-republican politics that the Constitution
established. These discussions demonstrate that the Federalist Soci-
ety is ready to carry on the intellectual patrimony of James Madison,
Alexander Hamilton, John Marshall, Joseph Story, Benjamin Curtis,
John Harlan, and, if you will, Robert Bork.
We are brought together today to engage in the debate over the
Constitution and foreign policy and how the original intent of the
Framers of the Constitution affects that policy. This debate is signifi-
cantly connected to the relationship between the executive and legisla-
tive branches. Perhaps no other issue of public policy brings the
relationship between these two branches into a sharper focus, or
causes more disputes between the major departments of the
government.
What authority does each branch possess, and what limitations
are placed on that authority? Both the original intent of the framers
of the Constitution and common sense call for a strong Executive in
foreign policy. The threat of encroachments on both the original
intent of the framers and common sense may weaken the Executive
and, in turn, cause great damage to our national security and our
position in the world. Moreover, the Founding Fathers were deliber-
ately ambiguous regarding the exact limits of the authority of the
executive and the legislative branches in foreign policy. The struggle
to define these limits is more political than constitutional or judicial.
Some who specialize in research concerning the Founding
Fathers and the original constitutional debates claim that the framers
intended for Congress to be the sovereign branch among the three
branches of the government. Or, if they argue that the three branches
are co-equal, these people would nevertheless have us believe that
Congress is, to borrow a phrase from George Orwell, "more co-
equal" than the other two branches. One possible source of this inter-
pretation of the power of Congress is The Federalist Papers3 and its
authors Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, who
attempted to assure their readers that the Presidency would not be a
monarch under the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Presidency was,
and is, a very powerful office. Nothing like it existed under the Arti-
cles of Confederation. Furthermore, the framers by no means
believed that the Legislature was infallible. In fact, James Madison
wrote about what he called the "tendency of republican governments
... to an aggrandizement of the legislative at the expense of the other
3. J. MADISON, A. HAMILTON & J. JAY, THE FEDERALIST.
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departments." 4
The Constitution itself shows a more concerted effort to restrict
the powers of Congress, rather than those of the President. Article II
of the Constitution, which concerns the power of the Presidency,
expressly confers the executive power upon the President.5 Article I,
however, which concerns the power of Congress, confers to that
branch "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted."6 The texts of these
articles suggest that although Congress was given only certain enu-
merated powers, the Presidency was given all of the powers that could
be implied by the term "Executive," according to the political theory
and practice of that time. The framers clearly did not envision either
a weak Executive or one whose actions were to be dependent upon the
pleasure of Congress.
The word most frequently used in The Federalist Papers" to
describe the advantages that would be gained from a strong Presi-
dency is "energy." An energetic President is capable of acting with
both dispatch and firmness. In foreign affairs, secrecy is an additional
requirement of success. These requirements are fully relevant in mat-
ters of foreign policy because it is in foreign affairs that a President's
role is most clear and complete. In foreign affairs, the President
serves as both the spokesman and advocate for the nation, and period-
ically, as its agent and negotiator. It is also in foreign affairs that the
President is most likely to encounter lawlessness and threats to the
peace and security of the nation. These challenges must be expedi-
tiously responded to if the President is going to carry out his pledge to
defend the United States. The President must respond to threats to
our security without a lawlessness of his own. He must, however, fully
use the power he derives from both the so-called executive power
given to him by the framers, and the duty he has to provide for the
defense of the nation.
Our history is full of famous examples of Presidents who have
used the power of their office to its fullest. President Jefferson dis-
patched the Navy to Tripoli to quash the Barbary pirates without first
consulting Congress. This particular event is commemorated in the
words of the Marines hymn about the shores of Tripoli. President
Lincoln took a number of actions early in the Civil War that stretched
the Constitutional powers of the Presidency to their limits, including
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 315-16 (J. Madison) (G. Carey & W. Kendall ed. 1966).
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America.").
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
7. J. MADISON, A. HAMILTON & J. JAY, supra note 3.
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direct defiance of the Supreme Court. He suspended the writ of
habeas corpus and ordered a blockade of Southern ports without per-
mission or affirmance from Congress. Over the decades, President
Lincoln has taken a lot of criticism for these actions. His overarching
motivation, however, was to save the Union, and when the dust had
settled, that was in fact what he had accomplished.
Another Executive who used his official power to its fullest was
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, a President from a different party. Presi-
dent Roosevelt sent military aid to Britain after the fall of France in
1940, at a time when the Nazis seemed to be an unstoppable jugger-
naut. Here at home, isolationism was a strong sentiment and Con-
gress consistently voted against military aid for our friends in Europe.
President Roosevelt saw, however, that world freedom would receive
a devastating blow if Hitler defeated Britain and seized control of the
British Navy. Consequently, he heeded the pleas of Winston Church-
ill and found a way to send Britain that aid. Many people have since
questioned President Roosevelt's actions, just as they questioned Pres-
ident Lincoln's. Robert Jackson, who was then serving as Attorney
General under President Roosevelt, wrote an advisory opinion finding
that Roosevelt's actions were legal. Nevertheless, President
Roosevelt's actions have always been the subject of great debate.
Once again, however, the presidential responsibility for preserving the
national defense was fulfilled only through the President's bold action.
More recently, President Kennedy used the power of the Office to its
fullest when he used his executive prerogatives to quarantine Cuba
and confront the Soviets in 1962.
These exercises of Executive power are not the products of
result-oriented pragmatism. All of these Presidents based their par-
ticular courses of action on one definite principle: The Executive
must do what is necessary for the preservation of the nation. This
principle was set forth in the extreme by John Locke, a theorist of
early classical liberalism. It is important to discuss this principle in
light of my original suggestion that the framers, in giving the Presi-
dent the executive power, were implementing a political concept that
was clearly understood by observers at that time. John Locke was
among the many political theorists read by the framers who gathered
in Philadelphia. The framers were familiar with his theory of execu-
tive prerogative.' In his Two Treatises of Government,9 Locke called
the Legislature "the supream power,"10 yet he affirmed a right, even
8. See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
9. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1960) (3d ed. 1698).
10. Id. at 374.
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an obligation, on the part of the Executive to go beyond the law when
the Executive's duties so required." In Locke's words, the Executive
should be able "to act according to discretion, for the publick good,
without the prescription of the Law, and sometimes even against it.'" 2
There was a feeling in Locke's writings that the Executive must
have the power and the ability to take necessary actions, however
extreme, in order to preserve the security and the essence of the
nation. Because of Locke's rather extreme view of the extent of exec-
utive powers in any government, it is, therefore, perilous to directly
apply his argument to the intentions of the framers. It is important to
understand Locke's views, however, so that we can then see how the
framers adopted and modified them to fit the limited form of govern-
ment that ultimately became the basis for the Constitution. The fram-
ers integrated Locke's theory into the overall democratic structure
that they were building as they developed the constitutional doctrines
of 1787.
For Locke, there was no earthly appeal against an invocation of
executive prerogative and no check on its use. In our system, how-
ever, the contrary is true. The Executive faces two limitations upon
his power. One is the possibility of electoral defeat. The President is
elected to a limited term, and either he or his party may face such
defeat if the electorate is not convinced that his actions were neces-
sary or proper. The second factor that limits a President's power is
the constitutional process of impeachment. In a sense, the impeach-
ment process of our Constitution improves upon Locke. According
to Locke, on certain occasions the Executive might have to act
outside the law. But under our Constitution, the Executive can exer-
cise the power that Locke envisioned and stay within the law.
The factors that act as checks on executive prerogatives, elections
and impeachment, are both democratic and political in nature. Obvi-
ously, there is no better example of the exercise of democratic govern-
ment than elections. Even impeachment, however, is democratic in
nature because it forces both sides to air their differences publicly, and
because the impeachment vote is influenced by the electorate. It is
unlikely that Congress would vote to impeach a President without
first being convinced that either the majority of the electorate sup-
ported impeachment, or that such support could be garnered in the
course of the impeachment proceedings. The Constitution, therefore,
does provide political means for the resolution of grave disputes con-
11. Id. at 373-75, 392-98 (discussing the extent of the legislative power in relation to that
of the Executive).
12. Id. at 393.
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cerning executive power. This model is in accord with the framers'
general belief that problem solving by democratic means should be
used in the United States. Because the authority of government is
derived from the people, it is ultimately appropriate that political
solutions be found to check the power of the Executive.
The Constitution simply does not give us all the answers to all
the questions about the relative positions of executive and legislative
power. Foreign policy disputes between the executive and legislative
branches are, therefore, political matters, rather than subjects for judi-
cial determination as part of the judiciary's function of interpreting
the Constitution.
The Constitution is not a comprehensive set of laws or a "high
level municipal code." Rather, the Constitution provides a frame-
work for government. Contained in it are the structure and the princi-
ples that should be followed in administering that government.
Certainly, the framers did not view it as their job to attempt to referee
all future disputes between the branches; rather, their concern was to
fashion a political system that could accommodate and solve inter-
branch disputes by the ordinary give and take of republican politics.
There are, to be sure, some acts by either Congress or the Presi-
dent that would clearly be unconstitutional. It is very clear, for exam-
ple, that it-is unconstitutional for the President to unilaterally declare
war." It is similarly unconstitutional for Congress to micromanage
the deployment of our armed forces, regardless of whether the coun-
try is at war or peace.14 This latter view is based upon the experience
of the Founding Fathers during the Revolutionary War. They learned
that a successfulwar could not be conducted by a committee, as the
Continental Congress attempted for a while. The war was succesfully
concluded only after that power was given to a Commander-in-Chief.
Similarly, it is the position of this Administration that the War Pow-
ers Resolution 15 is unconstitutional.
We would look in vain, however, for a clause in the Constitution
that precisely governs the outcome of foreign policy disputes between
the President and Congress. The framers understood that they could
neither rigidly define these relationships with exactness, nor draft the
document to resolve every possible situation that could arise in the
future. Rather, they left these struggles to the realm of politics.
One reason that the political debate becomes so complicated is
13. See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the power to declare war).
14. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1 (making the President the Commander-in-Chief of
the armed forces).
15. See supra note 1.
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because in such a controversy, it is often in the interest of one party to
attempt to make that political dispute appear to be a dispute of a dif-
ferent nature. In other words, a party will try to translate a political
contest of wills into a legal fight, or even into a constitutional fight.
Such a translation of a political debate is exemplified in the current
attempts to portray the issues in the Iran-Contra affair as legal techni-
calities, rather than as basic political questions concerning an appro-
priate presidential response to Soviet intervention in Central America.
People with certain political views are attempting to make those
views prevail without resorting to an election. Elections, however, are
the ultimate mechanisms for resolving interbranch political disputes
because they give the people both the opportunity to determine
whether the President or Congress is correct, and the power to deter-
mine the proper course of presidential action. For instance, if a sim-
ple referendum was presented to the American people on whether the
United States should allow the arrival of Communist totalitarianism
on the American mainland, there is little doubt about the outcome of
their vote. Rather than presenting the electorate with such issues,
however, some factions have sought the use of the appropriations pro-
cess, the advice and consent process, and even the ethics-in-govern-
ment process to work their will.
The call that I issue today, along with others in this conference,
is for a return to the framers' intention that the boundaries of legisla-
tive and executive authority in foreign affairs be resolved through the
political process. In a sense, I am calling for politicization, but only
for the politicization of issues that are properly political, and not for
the politicization of the law or the Constitution. Above all, I discour-
age any notion that the judiciary ought to be called in to resolve these
ongoing foreign policy disputes. The "political questions" doctrine
may have been abandoned in domestic issues, but in foreign affairs the
Supreme Court and the lower courts have generally shown admirable
restraint. Such judicial restraint is praiseworthy, even when a liberal
policy is challenged by a conservative. Such a set of events was
observable in the case of Goldwater v. Carter,16 wherein Senator Gold-
water sued to enjoin President Carter from abrogating a defense
treaty with Taiwan.17 The Supreme Court remanded the case to the
district court with directions to dismiss the complaint."8 A plurality
of the Court found that the case presented a nonjusticiable political
16. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
17. Id. at 997-98 (PoweU, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 996.
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question. 19
Treating foreign policy disputes as justiciable questions would
complete the unwarranted constitutionalization of policy differences.
In the process, the American people would lose the right to choose
their policies by electing their leaders. Some may argue against a call
for political resolution of foreign policy disputes because that might
militate against reaching a consensus in foreign affairs. After all, from
Pearl Harbor to the Tet offensive, American politics stopped at the
water's edge. We need very badly to renew that type of foreign policy
consensus today. A genuine consensus regarding the defense of our
nation and its foreign policy interest is the best possible situation.
Good faith efforts by both the executive and the legislative branches
are essential if they are to reach such a consensus.
There are times, however, when the two branches cannot reach a
consensus. Whether it is in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere, there will
be particular situations in which the gap between ideas is too great.
When that happens, the best method for resolving the issue is through
candid political debate. Through political debate, the people may be
led to an understanding of the issues and can make their views known
through their elected representatives. The worse course of action is to
pretend that a dispute over a fundamental policy should be unilater-
ally decided by the wording of an amendment in an appropriations
bill. This action is especially undesirable when the President is
coerced to sign such a bill by circumstances in which bad policy and
the unconstitutional usurpation of authority are made a part of the
law because of the necessity of maintaining the funding of the govern-
ment. Many have said that democratic politics is untidy. Indeed,
sometimes it is. But, as Winston Churchill once said, "democracy is
the worst system of Government except [for] all [the] other[s]." 20
Continual debate and controversy is unquestionably an unwieldy
way of conducting foreign policy. That is precisely the reason, how-
ever, that the framers of the Constitution provided the Executive with
the principal power to conduct foreign affairs. Through their exper-
iences during the Revolutionary War and the years prior to 1787, the
framers became familiar with the requirements of energy, dispatch,
and secrecy in the conduct of foreign policy. They thought it clear
that although certain powers were given to the Congress for the devel-
opment of policy, the conduct of foreign affairs was to be left strictly
to the President.
Simultaneously, however, the framers preserved the checks and
19. Id. at 1002 (Burger, Stewart, Rehnquist & Stevens, JJ., concurring).
20. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 150:19 (3d ed. 1979).
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balances on the Executive by giving Congress the power to declare
war, the power to appropriate funds for defense, and in extreme cases,
the power to impeach the President. Thus, in foreign affairs, as in so
many areas, the Constitution is carefully balanced. This characteris-
tic of the framers' work is the reason why that famous document has
lasted these 200 years; during this same period, many other constitu-
tions around the world have foundered and been replaced numerous
times.
In this bicentennial year of our nation's Constitution, it is there-
fore proper that we contemplate the work of the framers with special
admiration and special awe. In dealing with the subject of foreign
policy and national security, we should similarly contemplate the
framework and the structure that is set forth in the Constitution. In
obedience to the Constitution, it is paramount that the leaders of both
the executive and legislative branches determine how they can best
reach a consensus and formulate a coherent foreign policy strategy for
this country. If the two branches cannot reach agreement, however,
they should develop quick, expeditious, candid, and civil means for
resolving policy debates. Following the resolution of an issue, the
President can effectively implement policies that these two branches
have determined to be necessary for the good of the nation and for
world peace.
I conclude where I began-with the Federalist Society. It is the
Federalist Society, and those in law and politics who adopt similar
positions, who keep our written Constitution on the front pages,
rather than relegating it to a museum. The deliberations during this
Symposium have marked another contribution to the thinking and the
discussion about how our living Constitution conveys the authority
and the guidance for dealing with the critical public policy issues of
our day.
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